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Abstract: This article takes the long-standing fact of deviations from the principle of 
representation by population in Canada as the starting point and asks whether the consequence is 
the dilution of visible minority votes. It calculates voting power for visible minorities in 
comparison to voters who are not visible minorities for the 2004 federal electoral map using 
2006 Census data and for provincial electoral districts in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and 
Quebec. We conclude that vote dilution exists and is concentrated in the ridings with the largest 
proportions of visible minorities. Visible minority vote dilution carries special significance in 
light of demographic, policy and constitutional considerations. The article concludes by offering 
some suggestions for how the electoral boundary commissions that set the contours of ridings 
can address visible minority vote dilution, as well as possible legislative amendments.  
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Résumé: Cet article considère au départ le fait avéré de longue date de l'écart, au Canada, 
de représentation des diverses populations, et se demande s'il entraîne pour conséquence 
la dilution du vote des minorités visibles. Il calcule le pouvoir électoral des minorités 
visibles, en comparaison à celui des électeurs qui n'appartiennent pas à de telles minorités, 
pour l'élection fédérale de 2004, en utilisant les données du recensement de 2006 pour les 
circonscriptions de Colombie Britannique, d'Alberta, d'Ontario et du Québec. Nous 
concluons que la dilution de ce vote existe et est concentrée dans les circonscriptions à plus 
grande proportion de minorités visibles. La dilution du vote des minorités visibles prend 
une signifiance particulière en regard de considérations démographiques, politiques et 
constitutionnelles. L'article conclut en proposant des moyens par lesquels les 
circonscriptions électorales pourraient être tracées de manière à enrayer cette dilution du 
vote des minorités visibles. Il suggère aussi de possibles amendements législatifs. 
 
Mots-clés: voteurs, minorités visibles, dilution du vote
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Introduction 
 
 Canada’s electoral districts deviate 
significantly from the principle of 
representation by population (Ward, 1949; 
Courtney, 2001), so much so that Canada is 
an outlier internationally (Sancton, 2010; see 
Samuels and Snyder, 2001 for earlier data). 
This has been a matter of enduring political 
and legal controversy (Carty, 1985; 
Courtney, 1988; 2001; Courtney et al., 
1994; Eagles and Carty, 1999; Evans, 2005; 
Jenkins, 1998; Johnson, 1994; Roach, 1991; 
Sancton, 1990; Williams, 2005). Deviations 
from representation by population have 
traditionally favoured rural voters and the 
less populous provinces (Ward, 1949; 
Courtney, 2001). Demographic trends add a 
new dimension to this old debate because 
Canada is becoming more diverse due to 
immigration by visible minorities, 
particularly into the largest urban areas in 
the country - Greater Toronto, Montréal and 
Vancouver. Deviations from representation 
by population decrease the value of votes in 
exactly those urban areas of the country 
where visible minority immigrants are 
settling.  
 The recent debate surrounding the 
Fair Representation Act, (2011) which 
expanded the size of the House of 
Commons, focused on the formula for 
distributing seats to the provinces and 
inequalities in the number of seats 
apportioned to each province. The debate in 
Parliament on the Fair Representation Act 
engaged with the question of visible 
minority vote dilution by touching on the 
under-representation of the provinces with 
the highest number of visible minorities (see 
the debate in the House, Hansard, 2011). 
The legislation and the debate surrounding 
it, however, did not address the inequalities 
between voters within provinces, with a few 
exceptions (see Vongdouangchanh, 2011; 
Mendelsohn and Choudhry, 2011). 
Boundary commissions drawing lines within 
provinces are permitted to deviate by up to 
25% above or below the average riding 
population in the province, or even more in 
undefined exceptional circumstances 
(Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act 
(EBRA), 1985, s. 15). The Fair 
Representation Act only dealt with one side 
of the coin of representation by population 
in federal ridings – inter-provincial, but not 
intra-provincial disparities.  
In this article, we ask if the voting 
power of visible minorities is being diluted, 
taking into account both inter- and intra-
provincial causes. Visible minority vote 
dilution has attracted minimal scholarly and 
policy attention. The scholarship on visible 
minorities and elections has been primarily 
concerned with other questions, such as 
visible minority candidacies and their 
likelihood of being elected (Bird, 2011; 
Black, 2002; Black, 2008; Black, 2009; 
Black and Erickson, 2006; Black and Hicks, 
2006; Simard et al., 1991; Stasiulis and 
Abu-Laban, 1991; Tossutti and Najem, 
2003), or the voting behaviour of visible 
minorities including their partisan political 
preferences (Bilodeau and Kanji, 2010; 
Blais, 2005; White et al., 2006). There is 
also a gap in the democratic reform 
literature, which has been largely focused on 
the merits of electoral systems (see Milner, 
2004; Pilon, 2007; and Seidle, 2002 from 
among many), including the likelihood of 
electing visible minorities under alternatives 
to the single member plurality system (for 
example, see Law Commission, 2002: 16). 
Consideration of the impact of deviations 
from representation by population on visible 
minorities has been largely absent.  
An earlier article (Pal and Choudhry, 
2007) measured voting power in urban and 
rural federal electoral districts (FEDs) 
established by the 1996 Representation 
Order (R.O.) on the basis of the 1996 and 
2001 censuses, and concluded that urban 
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and visible minority votes are diluted in 
Canada. Vote dilution was concentrated in 
the largest urban areas of Alberta, British 
Columbia and Ontario. The 2004 R.O. 
replaced the 1996 R.O. and remained in 
place until 2013. The next federal election 
will be held under the map proclaimed 
through the 2013 R.O. (EBRA, 1985, s. 25).  
This article measures visible 
minority representation in FEDs based on 
the 2004 federal electoral map and the 2006 
census using a related but different 
methodology from the earlier article. The 
previous study looked at urban and rural 
voters, as well as urban visible minorities as 
a sub-category. This study measures the 
voting power of visible minorities and non-
visible minorities as a whole, apart from 
urban or rural residence.
ii
 We leave analysis 
of the 2013 electoral map for another day 
when data on visible minority populations in 
the new ridings is available.  
We seek to answer five main 
questions that arise out of our earlier article 
and the recent Parliamentary debate on 
electoral boundaries. The first three relate to 
the existence and level of vote dilution and 
the last two to the implications of our 
findings: 
 
1) Does the under-representation of certain 
ridings affect visible minorities 
unequally and lead to visible minority 
vote dilution in FEDs; 
2) If there is a disproportionate impact on 
visible minorities, is the unequal 
treatment concentrated in specific 
ridings or types of ridings;  
3) Is there a comparable level of vote 
dilution in provincial electoral districts 
(PEDs) in provinces with high levels of 
visible minorities;  
4) Does visible minority vote dilution 
violate the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (the Charter); and  
5) Can vote dilution be remedied within 
the current system for designing 
electoral boundaries by commission?  
 
Despite the redistribution and 
readjustment of electoral boundaries in the 
2004 R.O., we find that the 2004 federal 
map dilutes visible minority votes overall 
and that the ridings with small proportions 
of visible minorities have greater voting 
power than those with large proportions of 
visible minorities. Our findings likely 
understate the problem of visible minority 
under-representation, as continued 
immigration between 2006 and 2011 can 
reasonably be assumed to have increased the 
populations of ridings with large numbers of 
visible minorities relative to those ridings 
with fewer visible minorities. We also find 
that visible minority vote dilution exists at 
similar levels for PEDs in the four most 
populous provinces. We conclude that 
visible minority vote dilution raises serious 
constitutional issues, but that electoral 
boundary commissions and relatively 
straightforward amendments to federal 
legislation could go a great length in 
remedying the problem.     
One distinction is important to make 
before we continue. The concept of equal 
representation for visible minority 
individuals is distinct from the concept of 
mirror representation. Mirror representation 
assumes that social diversity should be 
reflected more or less proportionately in the 
personal characteristics of legislators 
(Kymlicka, 1995; Phillips, 1991). With 
visible minorities forming 19 per cent of the 
Canadian population according to the 2011 
National Household Survey, the concept of 
mirror representation would dictate that 
visible minorities are under-represented 
unless 19 per cent of those elected to the 
House of Commons are from that group. We 
make no claims in this paper about the 
necessity of mirror representation for racial 
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minorities. Voter equality instead refers to 
the weight of the vote given differences in 
the size of electoral district populations, 
without regard to the choice of 
representative made by voters.  
 
Methodology 
 
 Electoral boundary commissions 
determine riding populations with reference 
to total population, rather than eligible 
voters. We use total population here so that 
our results will be generated with the same 
unit of analysis as that used by the 
commissions. The R.O. of 2004 proclaimed 
the current electoral map in Canada in force, 
using 2001 census data. We applied 2006 
census data rather than the 2001 data used 
by the boundary commissions. We did so 
because to apply the 2001 census would 
ignore the demographic changes that 
occurred after 2001. We determined the 
visible minority variable according to the 
Statistics Canada definition, which in turn 
relies on the definition in the Employment 
Equity Act. Visible minorities are defined in 
s. 3 of the Act as “persons, other than 
Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian 
in race or non-white in colour.” The 
following groups are defined as visible 
minorities in the regulations: “Chinese, 
South Asians, Blacks, Arabs, West Asians, 
Filipinos, Southeast Asians, Latin 
Americans, Japanese, Koreans, and other 
visible minority groups, such as Pacific 
Islanders.” Aboriginal peoples are excluded 
from the definition.
iii
 The term “non-visible 
minorities” as used in the article denotes all 
individuals who are not visible minorities.  
 To calculate voting power for visible 
minorities and non-visible minorities, we 
first produced the national electoral quotient, 
which is the average number of individuals 
per district. We then calculated the voting 
power of each riding. We divided the 
national electoral quotient by the total 
population in each particular district to reach 
this number. We multiplied each district’s 
voting power measure by the visible 
minority population of the riding. We 
summed these results for all visible 
minorities to create a measure for the 
effective number of visible minorities. We 
divided the effective number of visible 
minority voters by the actual number of 
visible minorities in Canada. This produced 
the average voting power for a visible 
minority individual. The process was 
repeated for non-visible minorities. Under 
conditions of perfect voter equality, each 
district would have the same population, and 
the worth of every individual vote would be 
“1”. The same method was followed for 
PEDs, except the provincial quotient was 
used.  
 Other formulas have been applied to 
calculate vote dilution in the literature. 
Canadian districts have been analyzed 
frequently using the Gini index, which is a 
measure of inequality (Archer 1993; Blake 
2001; Carty 1985; Courtney, 2001; Sancton 
1990). Samuels and Snyder’s international 
analysis applies a modified Loosemore-
Hanby index (2001: 654-55), which 
calculates a riding’s vote share compared to 
its seat share. We use the formula detailed 
above because it provides a useful 
calculation by which to measure the impact 
of differential riding populations on sub-
groups such as visible minorities.   
     
Results for Federal Electoral Districts  
 
Does the under-representation of certain 
ridings affect visible minorities unequally 
and lead to visible minority vote dilution? 
We find that the 2004 federal electoral map 
dilutes visible minority votes in comparison 
to the votes of those who do not have visible 
minority status, which we label “non-visible 
minority voters.” The average visible 
minority individual in Canada has a voting 
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power of 0.89 and is therefore under-
represented. The average non-visible 
minority individual has a voting power of 
1.02, or marginally above voter equality. 
The difference between visible minority and 
non-visible minority representation, 
however, is 14.6 per cent. The traditional 
variance in riding populations in Canada 
results in visible minority vote dilution 
under the electoral map introduced in 2004.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Visible Minority and Non-Visible Minority Voting Power for FEDs 
Vis Min Voting Power Non-Vis Min Voting 
Power 
% Difference 
0.89 1.02 14.6 
  
 
Table 2: Voting Power by Percentage of Visible Minorities per Riding 
% Vis 
Min 
Low Proportion of Vis Mins High Proportion of Vis Mins 
 1% or 
less 
3% or 
less 
5% or 
less 
10% or 
less 
15% or 
more 
20% or 
more 
25% or 
more 
30% 
or 
more 
Voting 
Power 
1.37 1.24 1.21 1.19 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.88 
# of 
Ridings 
66 123 154 187 101 80 68 53 
 
 
Chart 1: Percentage Visible Minority Population by Categories (y) by Voting Power (x) 
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Table 3: The 15 Most Populous Ridings with Percentage Visible Minority, 2004 R.O.  
Riding Riding Population % Vis Min 
Brampton West (ON) 170,420 53.7% 
Oak Ridges-Markham (ON) 169,645 41.3% 
Vaughan (ON) 154,215 25.4% 
Bramalea-Gore-Malton (ON) 152,700 64% 
Halton (ON) 151,940 19% 
Mississauga-Erindale (ON) 143,360 51.7% 
Peace River (AB) 138,009 2.6% 
Mississauga-Brampton 
South (ON) 
136,470 60% 
Whitby-Oshawa (ON) 135,890 14.9% 
Nepean-Carleton (ON) 133,250 17.4% 
Calgary West (AB) 132,155 17% 
Thornhill (ON) 131,970 33.3% 
Brampton-Springdale (ON) 131,795 56.2% 
Scarborough-Rouge River 
(ON) 
130,980 89.4% 
Calgary-Nose Hill (AB) 130,945 34.9% 
Source: Mendelson and Choudhry, 2011. Data from Statistics Canada, 2006 Census, 
http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/prof/92-595/p2c.cfm?TPL=INDX&LANG=E 
 
 
Is the unequal treatment of visible minorities 
concentrated in specific ridings?  
 The overall vote dilution numbers 
conceal the differences between those 
federal ridings with relatively high and low 
proportions of visible minorities. Visible 
minorities made up 16% of Canada’s 
population overall according to the 2006 
census and 19% of the population as 
counted by the 2011 National Household 
Survey (Statistics Canada, 2011). Generally, 
the greater the percentage of the riding 
population made up of visible minorities, the 
lower the voting power. The least diverse 
ridings in the country in terms of visible 
minority status are dramatically over-
represented in comparison to the most 
diverse. We define a low proportion of 
visible minorities as 1, 3, 5 or 10 per cent or 
less of the riding population and a high 
proportion as 15, 20, 25 or 30 per cent or 
more of the riding population. The ridings 
with a visible minority population of 1 per 
cent or less have an average voting power of 
1.37 (Table 2; Chart 1). There are 66 out of 
308 ridings that fall into this category. To 
expand the category to catch a larger 
number of ridings, the 154 ridings with 5 per 
cent or less visible minorities have a voting 
power of 1.21. By contrast, the ridings with 
a visible minority population of 20 per cent 
or more have much lower voting strength. 
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The 80 ridings with 20 per cent or more 
visible minorities have a voting power of 
0.90, and the 53 ridings with more than 30 
per cent visible minorities have a measure of 
0.88. There is a 56 per cent difference in 
voting power between the ridings with 1 per 
cent or less visible minorities and the ridings 
with at least 30 per cent visible minorities. 
As an illustration, the 15 most populous 
ridings, where voting power is the lowest 
among all FEDs, have large numbers of 
visible minorities (Mendelsohn and 
Choudhry, 2011) (Table 3; Chart 2).  
 
 
Chart 2: Proportion Visible Minority Population per Riding (y) by Riding Voting Power 
(x), with National Visible Minority Population (16%) as a Reference (2006 Census) 
 
 
 
Results for Provincial Electoral Districts  
 
Is visible minority vote dilution present in 
Provincial Electoral Districts?  
 The preceding analysis assessed 
voting power in FEDs. Similar results can be 
found in PEDs. PEDs do not suffer from 
inter-provincial vote dilution, but significant 
variances remain between regions within 
each province. PEDs are determined 
according to different rules and processes 
than FEDs (Blake 2001), yet the dilution of 
visible minority votes also occurs in PEDs 
as it does in FEDs. 
 We looked at PEDs in Quebec, 
Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia, 
which are the most populous provinces and 
those with the greatest number of visible 
minorities, to measure whether visible 
minority vote dilution extends to PEDs. We 
focus on these four provinces because 
measuring visible minority vote dilution in 
the other provinces and the territories is less 
relevant given their smaller populations of 
visible minorities. In analyzing PEDs in the 
four provinces, we paired 2006 census data 
with the most recent electoral boundary 
information made available to us by 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00 3.25 3.50 3.75 4.00
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, 85-101 
 
92 
 
Statistics Canada and the provincial election 
commissions: Quebec (2001, 125 districts), 
Alberta (2010, 83 districts), BC (2009, 79 
districts) and Ontario (2007, 107 districts). 
Since we obtained our data, BC has 
subsequently adopted an electoral map of 85 
districts. Blake (2001: 10) and Courtney 
(2001: 194-5) both found a trend toward 
voter equality in PEDs in the 1990’s (with 
the exception of Quebec), echoing the 
earlier tentative conclusion of Carty (1985: 
285).  
 We find that the votes of visible 
minorities in provincial elections are diluted 
in comparison to those of non-visible 
minority voters, with a low in Quebec of 
visible minority voting power at 0.89 and a 
high in Ontario of 0.94 (Table 5). The 
movement toward greater population 
equality in PEDs overall has therefore not 
yet gone far enough to remedy the specific 
problem of visible minority vote dilution.  
As with FEDs, the least diverse PEDs have 
larger voting power than the most diverse 
ones. In Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and 
British Columbia, districts with small 
numbers of visible minorities have 
significantly higher voting power than those 
with higher proportions of visible minorities 
(Table 6). The dilution of visible minority 
votes in the most diverse electoral districts is 
a phenomenon at both the federal and 
provincial levels. 
 
Implications of Visible Minority Vote 
Dilution 
 
Does visible minority vote dilution violate 
the right to vote or equality rights in the 
Charter?  
 Our analysis has established that in 
the aggregate, the votes of visible minorities 
are worth less than those of non-visible 
minorities. This section investigates the 
constitutional implications of these findings 
and, specifically, whether visible minority 
vote dilution violates the Charter. The 
demographics of visible minority 
immigration and integration make this an 
important question. Visible minorities are 
rapidly growing as a proportion of the 
population, nearly entirely concentrated in 
urban areas, and there is evidence that they 
are disadvantaged compared to other 
Canadians. In our opinion, there is a strong 
legal argument that the dilution of visible 
minority votes is unconstitutional as either a 
violation of the right to vote in s. 3 or as 
adverse effects discrimination contrary to s. 
15 of the Charter. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Visible Minority and Non-Visible Minority Voting Power for PEDs 
Province Vis Min Voting Power Non-Vis Min Voting 
Power 
QC 0.89 1.01 
ON 0.94 1.02 
AB 0.93 1.01 
BC 0.92 1.03 
 
 
 
 
 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, 85-101 
 
93 
 
   
Table 6: Voting Power by Percentage of Visible Minorities per Riding for PEDs  
 
% Vis Min QC ON AB BC 
     
Low Vis Min     
1% or less 1.30 1.49 N/A N/A 
# of ridings 46 3 0 0 
3% or less 1.17 1.21 1.17 1.34 
# of ridings 73 27 25 11 
5% or less 1.15 1.17 1.09 1.22 
# of ridings 80 36 34 23 
10% or less 1.13 1.13 1.10 1.18 
# of ridings 88 46 43 38 
     
High Vis Min     
15% or more 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.91 
# of ridings 26 50 28 33 
20% or more 0.88 0.94 0.92 0.91 
# of ridings 18 41 21 31 
25% or more 0.87 0.92 0.91 0.91 
# of ridings 13 35 13 27 
30% or more 0.83 0.91 0.92 0.90 
# of ridings 9 31 10 23 
 
 
Visible minority vote dilution raises serious 
questions about the constitutionality of the 
electoral map given the Charter’s 
protections. One potential hurdle is the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence, 
as the Court has declined to exercise strict 
oversight of electoral maps. In Reference re 
Provincial Electoral Boundaries 
(Saskatchewan) (1991) (known as 
“Carter”), the Court held that the right to 
vote guaranteed in the Charter (s. 3) protects 
only the right to “effective representation,” 
not representation by population, and 
permits significant deviations from voter 
equality if they lead to the more effective 
representation of the population as a whole. 
The Court held that the more effective 
representation of rural voters justified the 
dilution of urban votes in the disputed 
Saskatchewan provincial electoral map 
before it.  
 The Court also held that relative 
voter parity was the primary, but not the 
only, factor to consider: “[R]elative 
parity…may prove undesirable because it 
has the effect of detracting from the primary 
goal of effective representation. Factors like 
geography, community history, community 
interests and minority representation may 
need to be taken into account…” (Carter, 
1991: p. 186). The Court appears to have 
been motivated by historical and pragmatic 
concerns. Strict voter parity was not 
guaranteed by s. 3 according to the Court 
because Canada had inherited the British 
tradition of permitting deviations, in contrast 
to the American one person, one vote 
principle. The Court was also concerned 
with the impact of a voter parity rule on 
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rural voters, who would lose influence, and 
the practicality of such a rule when remote, 
sparsely populated, and over-represented 
ridings already covered huge geographic 
expanses.  
 We have criticized Carter for failing 
to justify its interpretation of the Charter as 
permitting significant deviations from voter 
equality (Pal and Choudhry, 2007). In a 
parallel fashion, other commentators have 
argued that Carter’s doctrine of effective 
representation is inconsistent with the 
rationale underpinning s. 3 (Studniberg, 
2008). Yet others have criticized Carter for 
failing to acknowledge the partisan nature of 
the electoral map in that case, which 
overrepresented rural areas in Saskatchewan 
to the benefit of the sitting government that 
depended on a rural electoral base (Bredt 
and Kremer, 2004; Dawood, 2012; Pal 2011: 
299-300). Some commissions in the 1990’s 
used Carter as justification to limit the worst 
excesses of intra-provincial rural 
overrepresentation, but others ignored it or 
used it only selectively (Courtney, 2001: 
177-81). Carter’s lasting impact has been 
the validation of significant deviations from 
voter parity and a near abdication of 
constitutional oversight of the design of 
electoral districts.   
 Visible minorities face particular 
barriers in Canadian society that mean their 
diminished voting power is especially 
problematic. They endure a more difficult 
time gaining access to the labour market and 
achieving income parity relative to other 
workers (see Picot and Sweetman, 2005 for 
data). The Labour Force Survey from 
Statistics Canada found that among the 
working age population, the overall 
unemployment rate in Canada was 6.9 per 
cent, while for recent immigrants in the 
country for 5 years or less (the vast majority 
of whom are visible minorities) it was 14.7 
per cent (Statistics Canada, 2010). The 
unemployment rate of recent immigrants 
from Asia is higher than the general number 
for visible minorities, at 15.1 per cent 
unemployment, while accessing the labour 
market is a particularly acute problem for 
recent immigrants from Africa at 21.2 per 
cent unemployment. Even as immigrants are 
in the country longer, their unemployment 
rates remain above the Canadian average 
and that of the Canadian-born (Statistics 
Canada, 2010).  The unemployment rate for 
recent and longer-term immigrants is higher 
than the average for the Canadian-born 
despite the fact that recent immigrants are 
more likely to have a university degree.  
Forty-three per cent of recent 
immigrant households in a study of large 
urban areas had low incomes, nearly three 
times the rate of non-immigrant households 
(FCM, 2011). The study found that 
immigrants, and especially recent 
immigrants, were under-represented in 
higher earning occupations and over-
represented in lower earning ones (FCM, 
2011: 22). Discrimination also likely persists 
against visible minorities, even if there are 
disputes regarding perceived levels of 
differential treatment (Statistics Canada, 
2003; Reitz and Banerjee, 2006).  
Given this data, the policy 
implications of visible minority vote dilution 
are potentially troubling. Though further 
research is needed to assess whether there is 
a connection between vote dilution and 
policy outcomes, we should worry whether 
governments will discount the interests of 
this under-represented set of voters and be 
less responsive to their concerns than they 
would otherwise be under conditions of 
voter parity. As visible minorities are under-
represented, candidates and political parties 
may have less incentive to generate policies 
to appeal to visible minorities than they 
would otherwise.    
While we believe that voter equality 
is desirable as a matter of principle, and that 
the Court therefore erred in holding that s. 3 
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requires only effective representation, the 
Carter decision remains the binding 
interpretation of the right to vote. Despite 
this ruling, the Charter may still provide 
avenues by which to move toward greater 
voter equality through both s. 3 and s. 15.  
There is a good argument that visible 
minority vote dilution violates s. 3, even as 
understood by the Court in Carter as 
allowing deviations from voter parity. The 
Court in Carter held that deviations from 
voter parity are permitted only if they 
enhance the effective representation of an 
aggregation of voters. Visible minority vote 
dilution violates s. 3, in our opinion, because 
it means that this minority group receives 
less effective representation.  
Changing demographics have altered 
the constitutional consequences of vote 
dilution. The impact of over-representing 
rural voters, which the Court permitted in 
Carter, does not simply fall on urban voters. 
Carter arose from disputed Saskatchewan 
electoral boundaries in the late 1980’s and 
early 1990’s. The demographics of the 
country in 2014 are very different from what 
was before the court in 1991.Visible 
minority immigration drives nearly all 
population growth, the proportion of visible 
minorities and the foreign-born are 
increasing, and the vast majority of visible 
minority immigrants settle in the largest 
urban areas (Kerr and Mellon, 2010; 
Statistics Canada, 2007; 2008), which are 
traditionally under-represented.  
The Supreme Court in Carter largely 
dismissed inequality of voting power as a 
problem as long as it led to the more 
effective representation of a specific 
aggregation of voters, which in practice 
means rural voters. That logic is 
problematic, however, if the tradeoff is not 
between aiding a disadvantaged rural 
minority at the expense of a relatively 
prosperous urban majority, but between one 
disadvantaged aggregation of voters and 
another. The effect of urban vote dilution is 
to further disadvantage already vulnerable 
visible minorities by discounting their 
political power at the ballot box. 
Discounting the voting power of visible 
minorities reduces their electoral influence 
and subsequently diminishes the incentives 
of those in political power to defend their 
interests. Despite permitting variances, the 
logic of Carter could still support a claim 
that the electoral map harms the effective 
representation of visible minorities and, 
hence, violates s. 3.  
 Visible minority vote dilution may 
also violate the equality rights guaranteed by 
s. 15 of the Charter. The existing approach 
to representation has a discriminatory effect 
on visible minorities and urban voters. 
Discrimination can be either direct or 
indirect. Legislation that assigned each 
visible minority one vote, but two or three to 
each other voter, would be unconstitutional 
as direct discrimination. Where government 
action is facially neutral, but has a discrete 
and negative impact, this is indirect 
discrimination. The current system is 
facially neutral with regard to visible 
minorities, as neither legislation, nor the 
relevant constitutional rules, nor political 
institutions single them out for mistreatment. 
While visible minorities are not the victims 
of direct discrimination in the representation 
system, they are indirectly discriminated 
against as federal and provincial electoral 
boundaries have a differential, negative 
impact on them.  
 The decisions of boundary 
commissions single out urban voters, but 
location of residence is not a prohibited 
ground of discrimination under the Charter. 
Section 15 protects against discrimination 
on one of the grounds enumerated in the text 
of the provision or that the courts have 
found to be analogous to those listed. Place 
of residence is neither listed in s. 15 as a 
ground of discrimination, nor considered an 
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analogous ground, and is therefore not 
protected by the Charter (see Corbière v. 
Canada, 1999 at paras. 15, 62). There are 
benefits to this interpretation of s. 15. 
Governments can implement a program in 
one area of the country, but not others, 
without running afoul of s. 15. If s. 15 
prevented discrimination on the basis of 
place of residence, then government 
programs would be in danger of violating s. 
15 for spending money, for example, in one 
region or province rather than across the 
country. This also means, however, that s. 
15 does not bar discrimination against urban 
voters in allocating electoral districts.  
 Despite this gap in constitutional 
protection for urban voters, s. 15 does not 
permit indirect discrimination against visible 
minorities in the allocation of riding 
boundaries. The existing approach has 
discriminatory effects on a sub-set of urban 
voters, as it systematically discounts visible 
minority votes. The effects of the electoral 
map or the decisions of the boundary 
commissions result in adverse effects 
discrimination against a vulnerable minority 
protected by s. 15. Visible minorities are a 
disadvantaged minority that is negatively 
and disproportionately affected by the 
electoral map, which is sufficient to raise 
serious doubts about the constitutionality of 
the current boundaries. A distribution of 
seats that systematically disadvantages a 
particular “discrete and insular minority” 
(US Supreme Court, US v. Carolene 
Products, 1938: per Justice Stone, footnote 
4) should be considered suspect in a 
constitutional democracy, even if it does so 
indirectly.  
 
How can visible minority vote dilution be 
remedied, outside of a constitutional 
challenge?  
Vote dilution occurs when the 
population of electoral districts differs 
because votes are worth less in a riding with 
a large population than in a riding with a 
small population. Visible minority vote 
dilution results from two causes: 1) the 
under-representation of provinces in which 
visible minorities disproportionately reside 
as a consequence of the over-representation 
of provinces with relatively few visible 
minorities; and 2) the under-representation 
within provinces of the urban ridings in 
which visible minorities disproportionately 
reside as a consequence of the over-
representation of rural ridings with relatively 
few visible minorities. Reforms geared to 
achieving equality for visible minority 
voters must therefore focus on these two 
problems. The Fair Representation Act 
added more seats to the House of Commons 
in those provinces that are under-
represented, thereby addressing urban vote 
dilution and visible minority vote dilution 
across provinces. It did not, however, 
remedy intra-provincial vote dilution, which 
has an impact on visible minorities.  
In this section, we consider how to 
remedy visible minority vote dilution in 
FEDs focusing on intra-provincial causes. 
There are two main areas of reform: 1) 
boundary commissions interpreting 
“communities of interest” to include visible 
minorities and 2) legislative amendment of 
the permissible variance from voter equality. 
These two reforms would go a long way 
toward minimizing visible minority vote 
dilution.   
 The electoral boundary commissions 
tasked in each province with determining 
FEDs are the decision-making bodies 
potentially able to incorporate visible 
minority vote dilution as a consideration in 
their deliberations. The EBRA allows 
commissions to deviate by 25 per cent above 
or below the average district population in a 
province when setting riding boundaries. In 
undefined extraordinary circumstances, it 
permits even greater and unlimited 
deviations (EBRA, s.15 (2)). Boundary 
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commissions tend to design urban electoral 
districts with higher populations than rural 
ones (Courtney, 2001; Williams, 2005: 115). 
This continues Parliament’s practice prior to 
the introduction of commissions in 1964 of 
rural overrepresentation (Ward, 1949). The 
impact on visible minorities is shown in 
Tables 3 and 4, where the most populous 
ridings with the least voting power have 
large proportions of visible minorities. 
Commissions should consider the impact on 
visible minorities of over-representing rural 
ridings within a province. 
  One potential way in which the 
concerns of visible minorities are relevant to 
the decisions of the commissions is through 
the concept of communities of interest. 
Commissions are obliged by the EBRA to 
consider communities of interest. 
Community of interest considerations 
generally involve the distribution of voters 
from a particular aggregation across ridings, 
to ensure a voting bloc is not “cracked” into 
multiple ridings or “packed” into one to 
diminish its influence (Stewart, 1991). The 
rural community of interest has often been 
used to justify rural over-representation. Yet 
Carter permits consideration of the impact 
of riding boundaries on visible minorities. 
Carter listed a variety of factors that could 
or must be taken into account in drawing 
boundaries, including “community interests 
and minority representation” (at p. 184). It is 
therefore open to commissions to consider 
the impact of boundary changes on visible 
minorities through the community of interest 
principle.
iv
 Given the clear costs to visible 
minorities brought about by rural over-
representation, community of interest 
considerations should not be interpreted to 
assist only rural voters.  
 Legislative amendments could also 
assist in reducing visible minority vote 
dilution. Reducing the variance permitted in 
riding populations and the discretion granted 
to commissions would not directly deal with 
visible minorities, but would lead to greater 
voter equality and indirectly, therefore, 
reduce visible minority vote dilution. We 
have argued that the acceptable variance in 
the EBRA should be reduced from 25% or 
more in extraordinary circumstances to 5 or 
10 per cent (Pal and Choudhry, 2007). 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick 
and Newfoundland and Labrador have all 
moved to variances in this range for PEDs. 
Tighter limits for FEDs would restrict the 
range between populous ridings, which tend 
to be diverse, and those that have smaller 
populations, thereby limiting the negative 
impact on visible minorities.  
A model for reform comes from the 
United Kingdom coalition government’s 
democratic reform legislation, which 
addresses both voter equality and the need to 
ensure ridings of geographically manageable 
size. The Parliamentary Voting System and 
Constituencies Act (2011) establishes a 5 per 
cent variance, reduces the size of the House 
of Commons from 650 to 600, and institutes 
mandatory redistributions every 5 years 
instead of the current 8 to 12 year range to 
ensure constituency populations are kept up 
to date (s. 11). A very small number of seats 
are deemed “preserved seats” exempt from 
the 5 per cent rule, with two of the three 
outside of Northern Ireland being islands (s. 
11.6). In contrast to the EBRA, departures 
from the 5 per cent variance outside of the 
preserved seats would be allowed only in 
very strict circumstances. Section 11.4 
provides an exemption only if a constituency 
exceeds 12,000 square kilometers and it is 
“not reasonably possible” to adhere to the 5 
per cent rule.  
The UK legislation largely provides 
a template to be emulated in Canada for 
FEDs. The small number of ridings truly 
deserving of special treatment because of 
geography, such as Labrador separated by 
water from Newfoundland, could be 
classified as exempt from a 5 or 10 per cent 
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standard. A lower permissible variance 
would oblige commissions to adhere more 
closely to representation by population, 
which would aid visible minority voters.  
 
Conclusion 
 Canada’s system of representation 
seeks to balance regional interests, majority 
rule, and minority rights. The current 
representational tradeoffs, however, come at 
the expense of some of the most vulnerable 
Canadians – visible minorities and recent 
immigrants. Deviations from voter parity in 
the House systematically diminish the 
voting power of visible minorities. The long 
term demographic trends of visible minority 
immigration, the settlement of immigrants in 
our largest cities, and the population growth 
of the largest provinces relative to the less 
populous ones all point in the same 
direction. These trends indicate that visible 
minority vote dilution will become an ever 
more prominent feature of Canadian politics 
if the existing system of representation 
remains in place. Viewed in this light, the 
current representational bargain is 
disconnected from Canada’s new 
demographics, and should be reconsidered 
consistent with that old Canadian call for 
reform, representation by population. 
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1 The authors would like to thank the Maytree 
Foundation for funding this research and Alan 
Broadbent, Ratna Omidvar, and Alejandra Bravo 
for their support of this project. 
ii A distinction can be drawn between urban and 
suburban ridings. As this article investigates 
visible minority and non-visible minority vote 
dilution, we do not expand on the possible 
differences between urban and suburban vote 
dilution. Mendelsohn and Choudhry (2011) found 
that vote dilution is concentrated in suburbs. For 
ease of use, we use the term “urban ridings” rather 
than “urban and suburban” throughout this 
article, though we do not draw conclusions about 
urban versus suburban voting power. 
  
iii As Aboriginal peoples do not count as visible 
minorities under the Employment Equity Act 
definition, they are beyond the scope of this 
article. The impact of deviations from voter parity 
on Aboriginal peoples, however, merits further 
study. The over-representation of remote, 
Northern areas with Aboriginal populations might 
indicate that this group is over-represented as 
well. On the other hand, the urban Aboriginal 
population is growing, so urban vote dilution 
might translate into Aboriginal under-
representation. The accuracy of these hypotheses, 
their magnitude, and the aggregate effect on 
Aboriginal representation should be investigated 
further.  
 
iv Aboriginal peoples could benefit, like visible 
minorities, from being considered as communities 
                                                                                   
of interest. The impact of Aboriginal votes on 
election results can be diminished if a geographic 
concentration of Aboriginal voters, such as on a 
reserve, is split into multiple ridings. Considering 
Aboriginal peoples as forming communities of 
interest would encourage boundary commissions 
to avoid “cracking” reserves and thereby preserve 
Aboriginal influence in a given district.  
